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• Fast time simulations have narrowed down potential low SWaP
DWC definitions & examined the effect of detection range
– Reduced DWC definitions for non-cooperatives
– Below 3.5nm detection range, Corrective and Warning alert durations 
begin to drop below Phase 1 requirements
• Objective: Apply Phase 1 DAA alerting to non-cooperatives 
with Low SWaP detection range and DWC definitions
– Characterize pilot performance when provided with similar alerting 
time to Phase 1 but detection range of 3.5nm
• Compare DWC candidates 1 & 2 from fast time study
– Include wide range of closure rates
– Determine if changes to existing requirements are necessary
Background
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• Independent Variables
– DWC definition (within-subjects)
• DWC1 (“tau”) = 2000ft HMD, 450ft ZTHR, 15s modTau
• DWC2 (“disc”) = 2200ft HorzDist, 450ft ZTHR, no modTau
– Ownship speed (between-subjects)
• Slow (60kts)
• Fast (100kts)
• Embedded Variable (within-trial)
– Conflict type
• Closure rate (fast vs. slow)
– Intruder speed
– Approach angle
• Single vs Multi-threat encounter
Experimental Design
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• Participants
– 12 active-duty UAS pilots
• Average age: 36.67 years
• Unmanned flight experience: 1,336 hours avg.
• Manned flight experience: 1,731 hours avg.
• Four experimental trials (45 minutes each)
– Two pre-filed mission routes
• Fire Line (PT6) and Long Racetrack (FT6 Full Mission)
– Oakland Center (Class E)
• Ownship: Generic RQ-7 Shadow model
– Mission altitude: 8,000ft MSL
– Maneuverability
• Cruise spd: 60 or 100 KTAS
• Turn rate: 7deg/sec
• Climb/descent rate: 500 ft/min
– Surveillance 
• ADS-B In (cooperative)
– Detection range: 20nm
• Low SWaP RADAR (non-coop)
– Limited detection range: 3.5nm
– +/- 110deg azimuth
– +/- 15deg elevation
Test Setup
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• Primary Pilot Task
– Remain DAA well clear from other aircraft
• 6 scripted DAA conflicts per trial
– 5 single-threat non-coop intruders
» Varying speeds & approach angles
» Includes 1 “Blunder” (Warning at First Alert)
– 1 cooperative intruder (Phase 1 criteria)
» Racetrack: Single-threat, Crossing
» Fire Line: Multi-threat with secondary non-coop intruder
Scenario Design
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Encounter
Label
Intruder
Speed
Approach
Angle
Proportion
Fast Head on 170kts 0 17%
Slow Head on 100kts 0 17%
Fast Crossing 170kts +/- 90 17%
Slow Crossing 100kts +/- 90 17%
BLUNDER 100kts 0-90 17%
Cooperative 200kts +/- 45 8%
Multi-threat
(Fire Line only)
200kts (Coop) +/- 45
8%
100kts (non-coop) 0
25s-to-LoDWC -->
*Secondary tasks – scripted SA queries + electronic failure checklists
Icon Alert Level
Expected Pilot 
Response
Time to Loss of 
DAA Well Clear
Aural Alert
Verbiage
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DAA Warning 
Alert
Maneuver immediately 30 sec
“Traffic, 
Maneuver
Now”  x2
Corrective DAA 
Alert
Maneuver following ATC 
approval
60 sec “Traffic, Avoid”
Preventive DAA 
Alert
Monitor traffic; 
maneuver not currently 
required
N/A
“Traffic, 
Monitor”
Guidance Traffic 
Alert
No maneuver required N/A N/A
Remaining 
Traffic
No maneuver required N/A N/A
Alerting Logic
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• Research Question
– Is pilot performance with a low SWaP sensor comparable to performance 
with the Phase 1 RADAR?
– Are changes to the Phase 1 DAA alerting and guidance requirements 
necessary to accommodate low SWaP sensors?
• Expected Outcome
– Empirical data to help verify low SWaP sensor requirements and their 
interactions with DAA alerting, guidance, and display requirements
– Both DWC candidates expected to produce pilot response times and 
LoDWC rates similar to Phase 1
• Reduced hazard zones may preserve enough alerting time to maneuver safely
– DWC1 (“tau”) should yield greater horizontal separation overall 
– DWC2 (“disc”) should allow for more time to maneuver before LoDWC
Hypotheses
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ANALYSIS & RESULTS
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• Tau candidate 
– More susceptible to short Corrective alert durations
• Especially with Fast Ownship
– Fast Head On: Warning at First Alert (28s) 
– Avg. corrective duration overall: 17s
• Disc candidate
– Over 15 seconds of Corrective alerting time for most encounters
• Exception: Fast Head On
– Avg. corrective duration overall: 23s
Alerting Performance - Unmitigated
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Alerting Performance - Mitigated
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• Tau candidate - twice as many Warnings overall relative to Disc
• First appeared as Warning in fastest closure rate encounter
• Correctives also progressed to Warning much more often
– 47% vs. 26%
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MEASURED RESPONSE
&
ATC COORDINATION
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• No differential effect of DWC candidate on Aircraft RTs overall
– Nearly identical responses to Correctives & Warnings
• Aircraft RTs were faster compared to Phase 1 findings
– Uploaded resolutions with a higher sense of urgency
• Initiated edits 3 sec sooner; did not always wait for ATC response
– For all maneuvers against caution-level threats,
• 86% - Notified ATC before upload
• 60% - Waited for ATC approval
– Slightly more often with Disc candidate ➘
DWC Candidate
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• Pilots responded equally to threats of both equipage types
– Treated cooperative targets with same urgency as non-coops
• 85% of intruders were non-cooperative
• Developed consistent avoidance strategy, applied to all encounter types
– Limited almost exclusively to lateral maneuvers
– ATC Notification times comparable to findings w/ Phase 1 RADAR (8nm)
• PT6: more even distribution of coop (62%) vs. non-coop traffic (38%)
Intruder Equipage
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SEPARATION DATA
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• 3 total LoDWC out of 289 encounters = 1%
– Zero NMACs, nearly identical to Phase 1 performance
– All from 1 pilot, all short-duration Corrective alerts
• Corrective alert duration: 9-14s
• 2 due to ineffective altitude maneuvers
Losses of DAA Well Clear
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DWC Criteria
LoDWC Proportion
DWC sLoWC% Duration Cause Encounter
Tau 1.47 6s Early Return to Course 
(361ft. vertSep)
Slow Head On
(secondary threat)
11.27 16s Ineffective maneuver 
(altitude only)
Fast Crossing
Disc 30.63 9s Ineffective maneuver 
(altitude only)
Fast Head On
LoDWC Instances
SUBJECTIVE FEEDBACK
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• Two-thirds of pilots indicated that 3.5nm – or more – would be 
their minimum acceptable surveillance range
– One third would find 2.5-3nm acceptable
– Contingent factors:
• Higher mission task workload
– Secondary tasks were minimal distraction; stayed ready
• Emergencies – turning off course may not be feasible (low fuel, need to land)
• Vigilance decrements during long duty cycles
• Congested communication frequency 
• Latency
• “Expect faster response with GCS input controls”
Subjective Feedback
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CONCLUSIONS 
&
PATH FORWARD
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• Objective metrics clearly indicate that pilots can maintain DWC 
with either DWC candidate at 3.5NM detection range
– Tau ➝ less Corrective alert time + more Warning alerts 
– Full ATC coordination not always viable
– Disc ➝ longer Corrective times (~6sec) + earlier onset of Recovery bands
– Quick response times limited LoDWC occurrences to 1 pilot
• Pilot response times against Corrective alerts ~5sec faster than 
observed in Phase 1; no difference observed for Warning alerts
– Closer proximity at first alert
• 60% were active DAA alerts at first appearance
• Frequent short-duration Corrective alerts
– Pilots adopted a global strategy of initiating edits immediately in 
response to all Correctives (including against cooperative intruders)
• Aircraft performance (faster turn, slower climb) limited maneuver options
• Potential challenges to reducing detection ranges below 3.5nm
– Pilot acceptability
– May not be able to retain Corrective alerting (especially w/ Tau)
Implications
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kevin.j.monk@nasa.gov
conrad.rorie@nasa.gov
Questions?
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